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I study a two-period model of conflict with two combatants and a third party who is an ally of 
one of the combatants. The third party is fully informed about the type of her ally but not 
about the type of her ally’s enemy. There is a signaling game between the third party and her 
ally’s enemy where preferences do not satisfy the single-crossing condition. There exist 
perfect Bayesian equilibria in which the third party’s intervention worsens the conflict by 
energizing her ally’s enemy wherein he (i.e., the enemy) pretends to be stronger than he 
actually is in order to discourage the third-party from assisting her ally. This creates a 
dilemma for the third party which may be referred to as the indirect Samaritan’s dilemma. I 
find that the expectation of a third-party’s military assistance to an ally coupled with the third-
party’s limited information about the strength of her ally’s enemy can be strategically 
exploited by the enemy through pronouncements that would not have been credible if the 
third party was fully informed about her ally’s enemy. Remarkably, the third-party’s ally, who 
is fully informed about the enemy, is unable to counteract this behavior by using credible 
signals to reveal his information to the third party. In some cases, the third party and her ally 
are strictly better off if the third-party’s decision to withdraw from or stay in the conflict is 
based on her prior beliefs and not on the current conditions of the conflict even if observing 
the current conditions improves the third-party’s information. Unlike the standard Samaritan’s 
dilemma, a commitment by the third party to a given level of assistance may be welfare-
improving. 
JEL Code: D72, D74. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The literature on conflicts is large and growing.
1
The issue of third-party intervention in conflicts has recently received some 
attention from economists using formal game-theoretic models. Amegashie and Kutsoati 
(2007) endogenized a third-party’s choice of her ally while Carment and Rowlands 
 But the literature in subfield of  
third-party intervention in conflicts is small and fairly new. In the post-world war II era 
and the end of the cold war, there have been numerous third-party interventions in 
conflicts. Between 1944 and 1999, Regan (2002) identified 150 intrastate conflicts of 
which 101 had third-party interventions. Third-party interventions in conflicts have been 
in places such as Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, the former Soviet republics, and Cambodia. 
These interventions have involved countries like Britain, China, France, and USA and 
international organizations like the UN. Regan and Stam (2000) undertook an empirical 
analysis of third party intervention in conflicts and found that interventions in the earlier 
stages of a conflict are more effective. 
Intervention by the UN is expected to be neutral but interventions by countries are 
usually biased. The third party supports one of the factions in the conflict. For example, 
using data from the International Crisis Behavior project, Carment and Harvey (2000) 
found that 140 out of 213 interventions in intrastate conflicts over the period 1918-1994 
were clearly biased. In the post-war period, Regan (2000) also found that most 
interventions were biased. In his empirical work, Regan (2002) found that neutral 
interventions were less effective in ending conflicts than biased interventions. Betts 
(1996) argued that the idea of impartial intervention is a delusion and Watkins and 
Winters (1997) argued that biased interventions may be desirable. 
                                                 
1 See Blattman and Miguel (2009) and Collier and Hoeffler (2007) for surveys of the literature.   2 
(1998), Siqueria (2003), and Chang, Potter, and Sanders (2007) took the third-party’s ally 
as given and examined the effect of third-party’s intervention on conflicts. Unlike the 
present paper, none of these papers incorporate incomplete information amongst the 
parties. 
In this paper, I focus on biased interventions. I study a conflict with incomplete 
information and two combatants who fight over two periods. One of the combatants has 
an ally (i.e., a third party) who wants to assist him with military support in the conflict. 
The third party is fully informed about the type of her ally but not about the type of her 
ally’s enemy. There is a signaling game between the third party party and the enemy in 
period 1 where the enemy signals his type through the choice of his armed investments. A 
striking result is that there are perfect Bayesian equilibria in which the third-party’s 
intervention worsens the conflict by inducing the enemy of the third-party’s ally to  
pretend to be stronger than he actually is in period 1 in order to discourage the third-party 
from helping her ally or to back off entirely from intervening in the conflict in period 2. 
Hence the enemy of the third-party’s ally displays some bravado.  
Interestingly, I find that the expectation of a third-party’s military assistance to an 
ally coupled with the third-party’s limited information about the strength of her ally’s 
enemy can be strategically exploited by the enemy through pronouncements that are 
credible. Such pronouncements would not have been credible if the third party had full 
information about her ally’s enemy. To be precise, when faction A (i.e., the third-party’s 
ally) is the first mover in the conflict, faction B (i.e., his enemy), who is the second 
mover, reacts to faction A’s investment in arms if the third party has full information 
about faction B’s strength. But when the third party does not have full information about   3 
faction B, then faction B can credibly announce that he will choose an armed investment 
in the current period greater than his full-information investment, regardless of what 
faction A does in the current period. This announcement has credibility because although 
it is costly to faction B in the current period, it is beneficial to him in the future because 
the third-party’s belief that he is stronger than he actually is causes the third party to 
reduce her military assistance to her ally.
2
It turns out that there is a set of pooling equilibria with such credible bravado that 
survives the Cho-Kreps “intuitive criterion” but only the Pareto-dominant pooling 
equilibrium survives the Grossman-Perry refinement. In pooling equilibria, faction B 
benefits from strategic ambiguity about his type while there is no ambiguity about his 
actions (i.e., his armed investment).  In an interesting paper, Baliga and Sjöström (2008) 
show that a faction in a conflict can benefit from strategic ambiguity about whether he is 
armed (i.e., his action).
 If faction B had chosen his full-information 
investment, the third-party would have known his type. Remarkably faction A, who is 
fully informed about faction B’s type, is unable to counteract this behavior by sending 
credible signals to his ally (the third party) about faction B’s type.  
3
 The result that the enemy of the third-party’s ally shows some bravado accords 
with the intuition that a third-party’s intervention could energize the enemy of her ally. 
However, this is not because the third-party’s intervention angers the ally’s enemy as 
  
                                                 
2 This is because the return to the third-party’s assistance is smaller, the stronger is faction B. For example, 
when the USA suffers too many casualities in Iraq, she ponders more over whether her mission is 
worthwhile. Of course, the USA is directly involved in the conflict in Iraq but there is still the perception 
that she is there to help the Iraqi government to fight the “insurgents”. As I show in appendix C, my results 
still hold if the third party is directly involved in the conflict. 
3 If he is not armed, he may benefit from not disclosing this information because creating doubt about 
whether he is armed deters his enemy and if he is armed, he still may not disclose this information because 
otherwise his enemy might attack him.    4 
intuition might suggest. The enemy’s reaction is purely strategic; it has nothing to do 
with emotions.  
My analysis is related to Buchanan’s (1975) well-known “Samaritan’s dilemma”
 
where a Samaritan’s charitable transfers could lead to a perverse behavior by his 
beneficiary and a commitment not to make such transfers is welfare-improving.  
Most models of the Samaritan’s dilemma are complete-information models.
 4 By 
incorporating signaling into a model of the Samaritan’s dilemma, I follow an approach 
taken by Lagerlöf (2004), although my application and results are different from his. In 
Lagerlöf (2004), signaling in a Samaritan’s dilemma enhances efficiency while in my 
model, this need not be the case. While the signaling game in Lagerlof (2004) is a 
standard game in the sense that it satisfies the single-crossing property, the signaling 
game in this paper does not satisfy this property.
 5
My model differs from the standard Samaritan’s dilemma in one respect: in the 
version of my model with complete information, there is no Samaritan’s dilemma 
because the third-party’s assistance does not lead to any moral hazard behavior. It is 
incomplete information that results in a Samaritan’s dilemma. Furthermore, unlike the 
standard Samaritan’s dilemma, a commitment to refuse assistance does not necessarily 
improve welfare in my model. An interesting implication of the analysis is that what may 
 Moreover, there are no pooling 
equilibria in Lagerlöf (2004) that survive the “intuitive criterion” while there are pooling 
equilibria in my model that survive this refinement and even survive the stronger 
refinement in Grossman and Perry (1986).  
                                                 
4Previous analyses of the Samaritan’s dilemma include Bernheim and Stark (1988), Lindbeck and Weibull 
(1988), Bruce and Waldman (1990), Coate (1995), and Andolfatto (2002). Within the context of non-
military foreign aid, Pedersen (2001) and Blouin and Pallage (2009) examine the Samaritan’s dilemma.   
5 For examples of signaling games that do not satisfy the single-crossing condition, see Bernheim and 
Severinov (2003) and Andreoni and Bernheim (2009).   5 
matter is not a commitment to refuse assistance but instead a commitment by the third 
party to be strategically ignorant of the current conditions of the conflict and instead base 
her future military assistance (i.e., to withdraw from or stay in the conflict) on her prior 
beliefs. For example, if the equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium, then the third party and 
her ally are better off if the third party chooses to be strategically ignorant of the conflict 
in the current period. This is because the third party does not improve her information in 
a pooling equilibrium and the enemy of the third-party’s ally will choose his lower full-
information investment in arms if the third party could commit to being strategically 
ignorant of the conflict in the current period
6
However, the welfare implication of such strategic ignorance and commitment is 
ambiguous if the equilibrium is a separating one because although the stronger type of the 
enemy may pretend to be stronger than he is in the current period, the third party can 
make a more informed decision in the future about her military assistance to her ally. If 
the benefit of the latter effect dominates the cost of the former effect, then strategic 
ignorance and therefore a commitment to a given level of military support regardless of 
the conditions on the ground is not welfare improving. In this case, a commitment to 
 and instead base her assistance on her prior 
beliefs. Therefore, unlike the standard Samaritan’s dilemma, a commitment by the third 
party to a given level of assistance may be welfare improving. An obvious implication is 
that if the third party is not fully informed about her ally’s enemy, then the fact that the 
current situation of the conflict looks very bad should not necessarily be used as the basis 
for withdrawing from the conflict. This is consistent with the view of George W. Bush 
and Dick Cheney on keeping American troops in Iraq.  
                                                 
6 For an argument that strategic ignorance can be beneficial in an entirely different context, see Carrillo and 
Mariotti (2000).   6 
withdrawing military support may be welfare improving. Yet, it is also possible that the 
third party and her ally may be better off if she can commit to ignoring any improved 
information that she may have. 
It should be clear from the preceding discussions that even if the third party 
cannot commit to being strategically ignorant of the conflict in cases where such strategic 
ignorance would be welfare improving, what ultimately matters is a commitment to 
discard whatever improved information is acquired and instead commit to a given level 
of assistance based on the third-party’s prior beliefs. Alternatively, the intervention could 
be designed to be unexpected, although in most cases, this may not be easy. 
The paper’s main result may be referred to as the indirect Samaritan’s dilemma. 
This is because the third-party’s assistance does not cause her beneficiary to engage in 
undesirable behavior.  However, her assistance causes those that are in strategic 
relationships with her beneficiary to engage in undesirable behavior. This indirect 
Samaritan’s dilemma effect is not present in previous analysis of the Samaritan’s 
dilemma because the beneficiary of the Samaritan’s charity is not engaged in any 
strategic relationship with other parties. The indirect Samaritan’s dilemma may have 
implications for other applications apart from the model of conflict studied here. I discuss 
an application in my concluding remarks.  
My result does not contradict the aforementioned empirical finding of Regan and 
Stam (2000) because I am not arguing that actual military support per se increases the 
incidence of conflict. My argument is that the expectation of military support could 
increase the incidence of conflict. For example, in my two-period model, the incidence of 
conflict in period 1 would be reduced if the third party could offer military support in   7 
period 1. It is the expectation of military support in period 2 coupled with the third-party 
limited information about her ally’s enemy that increases the incidence of conflict in 
period 1. This has implications for empirical work. It suggests that conflicts may worsen 
prior to a publicly known and biased intervention and will improve after the intervention. 
Indeed, this effect may exist even if the third party has already intervened in the conflict, 
so long as she is still not fully informed about the type of her ally’s enemy. Hence, part of 
the reduction in the intensity of the conflict is not necessarily due to the intervention per 
se. Therefore, while a biased intervention by a third party may have a positive effect on a 
conflict, this effect may be overstated in empirical work (i.e., the relevant coefficient in 
regressions may be biased upwards).  
The preceding argument somewhat finds support in the empirical work of 
Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000). To deal with the endogeneity of third-party intervention, 
Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000) used expected intervention instead of actual intervention 
as the regressor in their empirical work. Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000) found that 
external intervention increased the duration of conflict.
7
My paper also contributes to the new and small literature on signaling in contests. 
Hörner and Sahuguet (2007), Munster (2009), Zhang and Wang (2009), and Slantchev 
(2009) examine dynamic contests with signaling. However, in these papers, the signaling 
game is between the players in the contest and there is no third party. In my model, 
 
                                                 
7 Of course, caution must be exercised here because my model is about the intensity of conflict and not 
about its duration. But more importantly, my argument for using expected intervention is different from  
Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000) because I am not arguing that expected intervention should be used as an 
instrumental variable in order to deal with the endogeneity of actual intervention. I am arguing that 
expected intervention and actual intervention may be distinct explanatory variables in a regression that 
seeks to explain the intensity of conflict.    8 
signaling game is between a player in the contest and an outside player (i.e., the third 
party). 
In Munster (2009) and Slantchev (2009), where the combatants move 
simultaneously in the conflict, they show that a strong player may feign weakness by 
pretending to be weaker than he really is in order to surprise his opponent in a subsequent 
period of conflict. This is also possible in my model if say faction A is uninformed about 
faction B’s type and they move simultaneously in the conflict. And in a dynamic auction 
where a first mover can use a jump bid to signal his type to a second mover, Hörner and 
Sahuguet (2007) show that both feigning weakness and displaying bravado are possible 
equilibria. In their model, displaying bravado is beneficial because it may cause one’s 
opponent to succumb which is similar to the motivation in my paper. And feigning 
weakness is beneficial because it cause one’s opponent to slack in a subsequent round.
8
However, my paper is different from above papers. First, although Hörner and 
Sahuguet’s (2007) result shows that displaying bravado could exist in conflicts without 
third-party intervention, my focus on third-party intervention in conflicts is important 
because it allows me to identify a different motivation for why a player in a conflict may 
display bravado and also to point out a possible perverse effect of a common real-world 
practice in conflicts (i.e., third-party intervention). Second, these papers do not obtain the 
result that a de jure second mover in a conflict can use his superior information to 
become a de facto first mover. Third, they do not uncover the indirect Samaritan’s 
dilemma effect because there is no third party in their models. Fourth, these papers do not 
discuss how a third party should react to the current conditions of a conflict in the sense 
  
                                                 
8 Zhang and Wang (2009) is different from these papers because they focus on the role of information 
revelation in contests.   9 
that strategic ignorance may be helpful or the withdrawal decision need not be based on 
current conditions of the conflict.
9
  Consider two risk-neutral factions, A and B in a conflict over a region (country). 
Faction A is an incumbent who governs the country and faction B is a challenger to 
faction A’s rule. There is a risk-neutral third party, C, who is an ally of faction A.
 In short, these papers focus on different issues. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a model and analysis 
of signaling in a conflict where I demonstrate what I call the indirect Samaritan’s 
dilemma. Several subsections deal with implications of the analysis. Section 3 concludes 
the paper. There are three appendices that elaborate on certain issues. In particular, 
appendix A shows that the players’ preferences do not satisfy the single-crossing 
condition and appendix B explains how an important parameter of the third-party’s out-
of-equilibrium beliefs is determined. Appendix C presents an alternative model of third-
party intervention. 
 





are two time periods, 1 and 2. In each period, there could be a fight (conflict) between A 
and B. Faction A’s valuation of controlling a proportion,   ∈[0,1], of the land 
(country) in period j is  j
A P V ≥ 0, where V > 0, j = 1, 2. Faction B’s corresponding 
valuation is  j
B P WH with probability q ∈ (0,1) and  j
B P WL with probability 1 – q, where 
                                                 
9 In Hörner and Sahuguet (2007), a player may show bravado, but will succumb when his bluff is called. In 
my model, this is not possible. If the player will succumb in period 2, then he will not show bravado in 
period 1. 
10 One may argue that the third party (e.g., the USA) may be directly involved in the conflict. I consider this 
case in appendix C. Moreover, it must be noted that third parties do intervene in conflicts by giving 
financial support for military expenditure without directly getting involved in the conflict.   10 
WH > WL > 0 and  j
B
j
A P 1 P − = . If faction A controls a proportion 
j
A P  of the land 
(country), the third party valuation is 
j
A P S > 0, where S > 0. Since a player with a higher 
valuation in contest is the same as a player with a lower unit cost of exerting effort (e.g., 
see Clark and Riis, 1998), I shall refer to the high-valuation type of faction B as the 
strong type and the low-valuation type as the weak type. The proportions could 
alternatively be interpreted as probabilities of victory in the conflict with S, V, and Wk as 
the players’ valuations of victory, k = H,L. 
  In each period, the factions in the conflict invest in a composite military good 
(hereafter referred to as arms, armed investments, or simply investment) that could be 
thought of being made up of weapons and soldiers. In period 1, I denote the factions’ 
investments in arms by G and in period 2, I denote it by X. So, for example in period 1, 
factions A and B invest in  A G  and  B G  units of arms and control the proportions 
) G G /( G P B A A
1
A + =  and  1
A
1
B P 1 P − =  of the land (country). A similar function 
describes the proportions in period 2. 
Without loss generality, I assume that the third party can help faction A in period 
2 but not in period 1.
11
Intervention can take various forms and can be modeled in different ways. I 
follow the formulation in Chang et al. (2007). In particular, when the third party spends 
M dollars on military subsidy transfer to faction A, it affects faction A’s unit cost of arms 
 For example, in the case of the USA, this may be due to delays in 
congressional approval of funding for military support of her allies.  
                                                 
11 This assumption is not crucial. What I need is that in period 1 the third party is not fully informed about 
the type of her ally’s enemy (i.e., faction B) and her assistance decision is taken before faction B moves. It 
also means that I could demonstrate my result in one-period model with more stages. However, the two-
period model below is more convenient for exposition. In any case, this assumption is the same as an 
assumption in models of the Samaritan’s dilemma where the Samaritan only lives in period 2 but her 
beneficiary lives in periods 1 and 2 (e.g., see Lagerlöf, 2004).    11 
through some reduced-form relationship such that faction A’s unit cost of arms is 
decreases from 1 to 1/(1 + M)
θ
,  where θ measures the degree of effectiveness with which 
a dollar of subsidy reduces faction A’s unit cost of arming and 0 < θ < 1. In appendix C, I 
consider a different formulation where the third party is directly involved in the conflict 
by choosing the quantity of arms to assist faction A. The results remain unchanged. 
The timing of actions is as follows: 
Period 1: 
Stage 1: Nature chooses faction B’s type (valuation): WH or WL. This becomes common 
knowledge to factions A and B but not to the third party. The third party only knows that 
Pr(WH) = q ∈ (0,1). The third party knows V. 
Stage 2: Faction A chooses his investment in arms 
Stage 3: Faction B observes A’s choice and chooses his investment in arms. 
Period 2: 
Faction B’s valuation in period 1 is also his valuation in period 2 but this is still only 
known by factions A and B and may remain unknown to the third party.
12
                                                 
12The assumption that faction B’s valuation in period 2 is the same as his valuation in period 1 is crucial.  If 
nature were to move again in period 2, there will be no need for signaling in period 1.  
 
Stage 1: The third party chooses how much help to offer faction A. 
Stage 2: Both factions observe the third-party’s choice and faction A chooses his 
investment in arms. 
Stage 3: Faction B observes A’s choice and chooses his investment in arms. 
  I look for perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria of this game and restrict attention to 
pure strategies. However, I first begin with the benchmark case of complete information 
where I look for a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.   12 
 
2.1 Benchmark: complete information 
  The single-period and complete-information version of the above repeated game 
without third-party intervention has been studied by Grossman and Kim (1995) and 
Gershenson and Grossman (2000).  Chang, Potter, and Sanders (2007) extend this model 
by introducing third party intervention. In this section, I follow the analysis in these 
papers. 
  Consider a single period and assume that the third party can give military 
assistance to her ally. In particular, consider period 2. 
  In stage 3, faction B of type k chooses  B X  to maximize 
B k k
A k B k
B k





= Π ,              (1) 
where  A k X  is the armed investment of faction A when his opponent is faction B of type 
k, k = H, L. 
Then the following Kuhn-Tucker condition must hold: 
0 X ; 0 1 W
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The condition in (2) implies that the best-response function for B is 
] X X W , 0 max[ X A k A k k B k − =               (3) 
Therefore,  B k X  = 0 if  A k X  = Wk. In this case, faction B will not challenge faction A. 
  In stage 2, faction A facing faction B of type k chooses  A k X  to maximize   13 
A k
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where Mk is the third-party’s assistance to faction A if his opponent is of type k, k = H, L. 
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Suppose that Mk = 0. Then using equation (6),   0 X*
B k >  if  
k
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− ,              (7) 
k = H,L. I assume that (7) holds. Hence faction A cannot deter faction B without the 
assistance of the third party. Indeed, a sufficient condition for my analysis is V < 2Wk 
for, at least, one k.
 13
                                                 
13 If V ≥ Wk for all k then there is no conflict even if the third party does not intervene, k = H,L. In this 
case, third-party intervention is not necessary, which is not a desirable feature of a model of third-party 
intervention. In this equilibrium, faction A is sufficiently armed (including the number of soldiers) leading 
faction B to acquiesce resulting in no conflict. See Grossman and Kim (1995) and Gershenson and 
Grossman (2000) for a discussion of this equilibrium. This equilibrium is not possible if factions A and B 
move simultaneously. 
   14 
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I assume that  0 M*
L >  but  0 M*
H ≥ . So when faction B is weak, the third party will 
always intervene but may back off when faction B is strong. 
  A few remarks are in order. Unlike the standard Samaritan’s dilemma, faction A’s 
payoff does not enter the third-party’s payoff function. However, there is a component of 
faction A’s payoff which enters the third-party’s payoff function. That is, the third party 
cares about the proportion of the land controlled by faction A and his payoff is increasing 
in faction A’s investment in arms. Over a certain range of investment in arms, faction A’s 
payoff is also increasing in his investment. Yet, as will be evident below, the expectation 
of the third-party’s assistance may induce faction B to invest more in arms which causes 
faction A to reduce his investment and reduces the payoffs of faction A and the third 
party in the current period. Therefore, the structure of the game is not different from the 
standard Samaritan’s dilemma. Yet, in a two-period version of this game with complete 
information, there is no Samaritan’s dilemma because the third party’s assistance does   15 
not lead to any undesirable behavior. As will be evident in the next section, it is the 
incompleteness of information that gives a Samaritan’s dilemma effect. 
 
2.2 Incomplete information 
  Note that the game between factions A and B is a sequential game of complete 
and perfect information while the game between faction B and the third party is a 
sequential game of perfect but incomplete information. It turns out that the signaling 
game here is not a standard signaling game in the sense that it does not satisfy the single-
crossing condition. However, the proof of this claim, given in appendix A, must wait till 
part of the equilibrium of the game is characterized. 
  There is also a signaling game between the third party and faction A because 
faction A may want to reveal what he does about faction B to the third party. However, I 
characterize the equilibrium of the game by assuming that faction A does not choose his 
investment in order to convey what he knows about faction B to the third party. 
Thereafter, I show that the assumed behavior for faction A is indeed an equilibrium 
behavior.  
 
2.2.1 Equilibrium in period 2  
Consider period 2. Given that in period 2, the third party gives her assistance before the 
factions engage in conflict and that this assistance cannot be withdrawn, it follows that 
the complete-information version of the conflict will be played in period 2 and so I shall 
draw on most of the analysis in section 2.1 with appropriate modifications.    16 
From section 2.1, faction B of type k’s best response function in period 2 is 
A k A k k B k X X W X − = , k = H, L. Therefore, using equation (5), gives faction A’s 
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where M is the third-party’s assistance to faction A that will be determined shortly and k 
= H, L. 
Then faction B of type k invests  A k A k k B k X ˆ X ˆ W X ˆ − = . That is, using (6), 
k
2 2
B k W 4
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= ,              (12) 
in period 2, conditional on the third-party’s assistance, k = H,L. 
The proportion of the land to faction B of type k in period 2 is 
k
B k W 2
V ) M 1 (
1 P ˆ
θ +
− = ,                 (13) 
k = H, L. 
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B k .           (14) 
Clearly, faction B’s payoff in (14) is decreasing in the third-party’s military 
assistance to faction A.  
                                                 
14 I focus on interior solutions in which case faction A cannot deter faction B with or without military 
assistance. As explained in the previous section, a sufficient condition for my analysis is that, in the 
absence of the third party, faction A cannot deter, at least, one type of faction B.   17 
 Let  ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ µ  be the third-party’s belief in period 2 that faction B (i.e., the 
opponent of her ally) is a strong type. Then, the third party will choose her assistance M 
to faction A to maximize  
M ) M 1 (
W 2
V
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I assume that  0 ) ( M ˆ > µ ∀  ) 1 , 0 [ ∈ µ  but  0 ) ( M ˆ ≥ µ  for μ = 1.  
  I focus on interior solutions by assuming that, in equilibrium the expressions in 
(12), (13), and (14) are positive. This means that faction A cannot deter either type of 
faction B even with the third-party’s assistance. None of my results hinge on this 
assumption. 
Given (16), it is obvious that the third-party’s military assistance is decreasing in 
her belief that her ally’s enemy is a strong type. The intuition is that the higher is the 
third-party’s belief that faction B is strong, the smaller is the marginal return to her 
military assistance (see equation (15)). Therefore, this result and equation (14) imply that 
faction B’s payoff in period 2 is increasing in the third-party’s belief that he is strong. 
This explains why faction B may pretend to be stronger than he actually is. This is costly 
to him in period 1 but beneficial in period 2 because it will cause the third party to reduce 
her assistance to faction A.  
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2.2.2 Pooling equilibrium in period 1 
Consider period 1. Recall that in this period I assume, without any loss of 
generality, that the third party cannot, give any military assistance. Consider a pooling 
equilibrium where both types of faction B choose  *
B H B B H B L G G ˆ G G > = =  with μ = q. 
In this case, faction A’s first-mover advantage is useless because it is as though, in period 
1, faction B has publicly made it known to faction A that he is committed to an 
investment of  B G ˆ , greater than his full-information investment, no matter what faction A 
does. Faction B’s pronouncement is credible because of the associated benefits to him in 
period 2 stemming from the reduced military assistance to faction A. If the third party 
was fully informed about the strength of faction B, this pronouncement would not have 
been credible because it would not affect the third-party’s decision in period 2. This is an 
important point and I shall prove this can be sustained in equilibrium. 
Therefore, as a second mover, faction B’s best-response in period 1 to any 
investment chosen by faction A is  B B k G ˆ G = ∀GA, k = H,L. To reiterate, faction B can 
credibly say that he will not react to any investment chosen by faction A in period 1 
because by committing to  B B k G ˆ G = , he will benefit from the conflict in period 2 so 
long as the third party posterior belief  that faction B is strong is greater than her prior 
belief because of faction B’s commitment. This leads to a reduction in the third-party’s 
assistance to faction A. 
Mindful of faction B’s credible pronouncement, faction A best responds to  B G ˆ by 
choosing  B B A G ˆ G ˆ V G ˆ − = . Therefore, acting as the de facto first mover faction B’s 
payoff in period 1 is   19 
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k = H, L.  
 It is important to note that  *
B k G ˆ = arg max




k G ˆ > Π , where  
*




 is, of course, the full-information investment of  faction 
B of type k in period 1 (i.e., when the third party has full information in which case, as a 
second mover, he reacts to faction A’s choice of investment).  Note that,  is strictly 
increasing in  B G ˆ for  ) G ˆ , 0 [ G ˆ *
B L B∈  attaining its maximum at  *
B L G ˆ and given that WH > 
WL,  1
H ˆ Π is strictly increasing in  B G ˆ  for  ] G ˆ , 0 [ G ˆ *




H G ˆ / ˆ G ˆ / ˆ ∂ Π ∂ > ∂ Π ∂  
at any given  B G ˆ . Finally, it is useful to note that  1
k ˆ Π is decreasing in  B G ˆ for 
] V , G ˆ [ G ˆ *
B H B ∈  and  *
B H G ˆ  >  *
B L G ˆ , k = H,L. 
Before I continue, an important remark is in order. Nothing in the construction of 
the equilibria depend on faction B’s de facto first-mover role. The pooling and separating 
equilibria below still hold by assuming that faction B is the de jure first mover.
16
                                                 
15 One obtains this equation by setting M = 0 in equation (12). 
16The only difference is if faction B was the de jure first mover in period 1, then his full-information 
investment will be higher and so in the unique pooling equilibrium one type does not show bravado. In 
particular, the strong type does not but the weak type does. 
 The 
interesting aspect about the present set-up is that it allows us to argue that faction B can 
exploit his informational advantage vis-à-vis the third party to act in a way which makes 
him the de facto first mover even though faction A is the de jure first mover.   20 
Conditional on  A G ˆ , consider the following out-of-equilibrium beliefs for the 
third party: 
) G ˆ , 0 [ G
] G ˆ , G ˆ [ G




















= µ             (18a) 
where λ > 0. In appendix B, I explain how λ is determined. 
For the sake of argument, suppose λ = 0. Then, if either type of faction B deviates 
in period 1 by increasing his investment  by a very small amount his payoff in period 1 
only falls marginally or may increase while his payoff in period 2 increases 
discontinuously. Under these conditions, both types of faction B will deviate. However, 
given that it is a strictly dominant strategy for both types to increase their investment by a 
very small amount, the third party, using Bayes’ rule, should believe that µ = q if she 
observes very small increases from the equilibrium investment. Hence, the beliefs in 
(18a) are not reasonable if  λ = 0. This explains why λ > 0.  
Note that given the beliefs in (18a), any  ) G ˆ , 0 [ G ˆ *
B H B ∈  cannot be part of a 
pooling equilibrium. This is because if the strong type of faction B deviates to  *
B H G ˆ , he 
will increase in his payoff in period 1 because he will be choosing his optimal investment 
in arms and his payoff in period 2 will not fall because the third party’s belief that he is 
strong will stay the same or increase which means that the third party will not increase his    21 
military assistance to faction A. Therefore, it makes sense to focus on  ] V , G ˆ [ G ˆ *
B H B ∈  as 
possible candidates for a pooling equilibrium.
17
] V , G ˆ [ G ˆ *
B H B ∈
  
Therefore, suppose  . Consider any type of faction B. If he 
deviates by increasing his investment he will reduce his payoff in period 1 but may 
increase his payoff in period 2 because the third party will reduce his assistance to faction 
A if the increase is greater than λ. If the former effect is costlier than the benefit of the 
latter effect, then he will not deviate. On the other hand, if he deviates by reducing his 
investment, he may increase his payoff in period 1 if he is a weak type and will reduce 
his payoff in period 1 if he is a strong type. However, he will reduce his payoff in period 
2 because the third party will increase his assistance to faction A. He will not deviate if 
the latter effect dominates the former effect. Under these conditions,  ] V , G ˆ [ G ˆ *
B H B ∈  is a 
perfect Bayesian pooling equilibrium. 
Let  )) ( M ˆ ( ˆ ) G ( ˆ ) , G ( 2
k B
1
k B k µ Π + Π = µ Θ . Then, given  ] V , G [ G ˆ *
B H
1
B ∈  and the 
beliefs in (18a), there exists a perfect Bayesian pooling equilibrium if 
)) G ( , G ( ) q , G ˆ ( B B k B k µ Θ ≥ Θ               (19) 
 for all  B G  and k = H,L. It is easy to see that given the beliefs in (18a) and choice of λ in 
appendix B, we can choose the other parameters of the model to ensure that the inequality 
in (19) holds. 
I use the Cho-Kreps “intuitive criterion” to place restrictions on out-of-
equilibrium beliefs. In my model, the “intuitive criterion” requires that out-of-equilibrium 
                                                 
17If faction B invests V in arms, then faction A will invest zero, so there is no point for faction B to invest 
more than V.   22 
beliefs put no weight on types that have no incentive to deviate from a given equilibrium 
no matter what the third party would conclude from observing the deviation. Given that 
the payoff of each type of faction B is strictly increasing in μ, it follows that faction B’s 
equilibrium action dominates any out-of-equilibrium action if his equilibrium payoff is 
higher than any out-of-equilibrium payoff even if such an out-of-equilibrium action 
causes the third party to believe that faction B is a strong type (i.e., μ = 1). Accordingly, 
the pooling equilibria above satisfy the Cho-Kreps “intuitive criterion” if there is no 
B G such that 
) q , G ˆ ( ) 1 , G ( B k B k Θ > Θ  and  ) q , G ˆ ( ) 1 , G ( B j B j Θ < Θ ,         (20) 
k, j = H,L and k ≠ j. 
Given (19) and the beliefs in (18a), neither type of faction B has an out-of-
equilibrium increase in investment greater than or equal to λ that gives a higher payoff 
than his equilibrium payoff even if the third party believed that the deviation was by a 
strong type. However, as argued above, there are increases from the equilibrium 
investment smaller than λ which are strictly dominant strategies for each type if the third 
party believed that such deviations were made by the strong type. 
 But in such cases, the  








H G ˆ / ˆ G ˆ / ˆ ∂ Π ∂ > ∂ Π ∂  at any given  B G ˆ and  *
B H G ˆ  >  *
B L G ˆ . 
Therefore, a reduction in investment in period 1 is more costly for the strong type than 
for the weak type and, in some cases, is even beneficial to the weak type. Also from (11), 
                                                 
18It is in these cases that stronger refinements like the D1 condition in Cho and Kreps (1987), divinity in 
Banks and Sobel (1987), and the refinement in Grossman and Perry (1986) suggest what to do. The D1 
condition would suggest that we put the entire weight on the type that is willing to deviate for a wider 
range of inferences by the receiver (i.e., uninformed party) while the divinity refinement would suggest that 
we place relatively more weight on this type. In these cases, we can also use the Grossman-Perry 
refinement. Indeed, as I argue below, the Grossman-Perry refinement gives a unique pooling equilibrium.   23 
M / X ˆ M / X ˆ
A H A L ∂ ∂ > ∂ ∂ . Hence, for a given reduction in military assistance, faction A 
reduces his investment in period 2 by a bigger amount if faction B is weak than if faction 
B is strong. Hence the weak type benefits more from a given reduction in assistance to 
faction A. Suppose the strong type finds it profitable to deviate to a smaller investment if 
the third party believed that he was strong. Then the preceding arguments imply that  
the weak type will also find such a deviation profitable.
19
] V , G ˆ [ G ˆ *
B H B ∈
 In this case, the “intuitive 
criterion” does not tell us what to do and so has no bite.  
The above arguments imply that any perfect Bayesian pooling equilibrium with 
 survives the Cho-Kreps “intuitive criterion” and so, based on the  
intuitive criterion, the beliefs in (18a) are reasonable.  
Note that for any ] V , G ˆ [ G ˆ *
B H B ∈ , both types of faction B pretend to be stronger 
than they really are by investing in a higher level of arms relative to the case of complete 
information or the case of no military support in period 2. 
Finally, the analysis has been based on the assumption that conditional on the 
equilibrium strategies of faction B and the third party, it is optimal for faction A to 
choose his subgame-perfect investment in each period. In particular, faction A would 
choose  B B A G ˆ G ˆ V G ˆ − = > 0 in period 1. However, since faction A knows faction B’s 
type, he may not choose  A G ˆ but instead choose his investment in period 1 with the goal 
                                                 
19While any decrease (deviation) that the strong type finds profitable is also profitable to the weak type, the 
converse is not true. That is, there are some decreases in investment that the weak type finds profitable but 
are not profitable to the strong type. Hence, it is reasonable for the third party to set μ = 0 in (18a) for 
investments smaller than the pooling equilibrium investment. This kind of reasoning is in the spirit of the 
D1 condition of Cho and Kreps (1987).    24 
of revealing faction B’s type to the third party. Given  B G ˆ , this strategy is costly to 
faction A in period 1 but may be beneficial to him in period 2. 
Note that faction A has no incentive to signal to the third party that faction B is 
strong because that means that faction A will get less military assistance. Therefore, his 
goal is to signal to the third party that faction B is weak. Note also that the third party 
cannot believe whatever faction A says because he has the incentive to say that faction B 
is weak when in fact he is strong.
20
) G ˆ , 0 [ G
] G ˆ , G ˆ [ G





















 Then the pooling equilibria above can be supported 
by arguing that the third party will believe that faction B is weak type if and only if 
faction A invested a small amount in period 1 which can be suitably chosen to be make it 
unprofitable for faction A to do so. For example, suppose the third-party’s out-of-
equilibrium belief is: 
            (18b) 
where γ > 0 and  0 G ˆ
A ≥ γ − . Since factions A and B have diametrically-opposed 
objectives in terms of what they want the third party to believe, it is not surprising that 
the belief in (18b) is a mirror image of the belief in (18a). An analysis similar to the one 
in appendix B shows how γ should be set to make it unprofitable for faction A to deviate 
                                                 
20 One may find this counterintuitive on the grounds that faction A will use the difficulty of the war as the 
basis for asking for help and therefore has the incentive to indeed truthfully report that faction B is strong. 
But this argument misses a fundamental point. While the third party may appreciate the difficulty of the 
war, what she is ultimately interested in is if the war can be won (i.e., what is the likelihood of victory).  
Since for a given assistance, the equilibrium probability of victory or the proportion of the territory 
controlled by faction A is higher when faction B is weak than when faction B is strong, faction A’s 
incentive to report that faction B is weak is to assure the third party of a high probability of victory or a 
high return to her assistance in terms of the proportion of territorial control.   25 




B H B G ˆ G ˆ =
 
The act of bravado by faction B is a dilemma for the third party because her 
assistance can make things worse in period 1 by energizing faction B in period 1. Yet, in 
period 2, she cannot commit not to offer assistance to faction A. Therefore, faction B will 
rationally expect the third party to play her Nash strategy in period 2. This creates what 
one might call the indirect Samaritan’s dilemma for the third party for reasons given in 
section 1.  
I summarize the analysis in the following proposition: 
Proposition 1 (The indirect Samaritan’s dilemma): There exists a set of pooling 
equilibria that survive the “intuitive criterion” in which faction B of either type pretends 
to be stronger than he actually is by choosing an armed investment higher than his full-
information level of investment in order to induce the third party to reduce his military 
assistance to faction A (i.e., the third-party’s ally).  
Since the third party’s military assistance is the same across all the pooling 
equilibria, it follows that the pooling equilibrium which gives the highest payoff to either 
type of faction B is  . It turns out that this is the only pooling equilibrium that 
satisfies the Grossman-Perry refinement which is stronger than the “intuitive criterion”.  
To see this, assume that third party believes that a deviator belongs to the set, S, 
of types. In this case, S = {WH} or {WL} or {WH,WL}. Let the third party update her 
beliefs using Bayes’ rule and choose her military according to  ) ( M ˆ µ . Grossman and 
Perry (1986) require the third party to ask the following questions: (a) would all types in 
                                                 
21 These arguments are available on request.   26 
S be strictly better off by this deviation given the military assistance chosen by the third 
party?, and (b) Is it the case that types that do not belong to S will not be better off by this 
deviation even if they received the same military assistance as those in S? If the answer to 
(a) and (b) is yes, then the equilibrium fails to satisfy the Grossman-Perry refinement. 
First, note that if S is a singleton, then the Grossman-Perry refinement is equivalent to the 
“intuitive criterion”.  So it remains to apply the refinement to the case of S = {WH,WL}. 
In this case, the third party maintains her prior beliefs. If so, then both types are strictly 
better off by deviating to GB <  B G ˆ  if  ] V , G ˆ ( G ˆ *
B H B ∈ .  Therefore, these pooling 
equilibria do not survive the Grossman-Perry refinement. If  B G ˆ =  *
B H G , then the strong 
type will not deviate but the weak type will deviate by reducing his investment. But then 
the third party should believe that μ= 0 in which case the weak type will not deviate. This 
leads to the following proposition: 
Proposition 2: Given pooling equilibria in which faction B pretends to be stronger than 
he actually is, the Grossman-Perry refinement picks the Pareto-dominant pooling 
equilibrium as the unique equilibrium. 
   
2.2.3 Separating equilibrium in period 1 
In standard signaling games, separating equilibria tend to exist and survive the 
“intuitive criterion” while pooling equilibria may not exist.
22
                                                 
22 Cho and Sobel (1990) show that standard signaling games (i.e., strategy sets and payoff functions satisfy 
monotonicity  properties)  have a separating equilibrium and it is the only equilibrium that satisfies the  D1 
condition in Cho and Kreps (1987). As would be evident in appendix A, in this signaling game, the 
informed type’s payoff function is not monotonic in his message. 
 Not surprisingly, a   27 
separating equilibrium is easier to characterize than a pooling equilibrium in this game. In 
particular, the choice of out-of-equilibrium beliefs is more straightforward. 
In the present game, there is a separating equilibrium in period 1 in which the 
strong type pretends to be stronger than he is and the weak type chooses his full-
information investment,  *




B H G G ˆ > in period 1 and the weak type chooses   *
B L G , where it needs to be recalled 
that  *
B H G ˆ is the investment that maximizes the payoff of the strong type of faction B 
when he acts likes the de facto first mover and  *
B H G  is his investment in the full-
information case where he is the second mover.
23
0 ) G ( *
B L = µ
 The third-party’s equilibrium beliefs in 
period 2 are   and  1 ) G ˆ ( *
B H = µ . In period 2, her military assistance to faction 
A when his enemy is the strong type of faction B is  ) 1 ( M ˆ  and her assistance when faction 
A’s enemy is the weak type of faction B is  ) 0 ( M ˆ . 











A L G VG G − = > 0. Conditional on these equilibrium investments, let the third-
party’s out-of-equilibrium beliefs be: 
) G ˆ , 0 [ G





















= µ = µ .        (21) 
Given (21), a separating equilibrium exists if  
                                                 
23 Note that since types are fully revealed in this case, the weak type gains nothing by deviating from his 
full-information investment. Hence, he best responds to faction A’s investment.   28 
)) G ( , G ( ) 1 , G ˆ ( B B H
*
B H H µ Θ ≥ Θ ,              (22) 
and  
)) G ( , G ( ) 0 , G ( B B L
*
B L L µ Θ ≥ Θ               (23) 
 for all  B G . Again, we choose the parameters of model to ensure that (22) and (23) hold. 
I need to argue that this equilibrium is supported by reasonable out-of-equilibrium 
beliefs. Recall that  *
B H G ˆ = arg max




H G ˆ > Π . Therefore, the strong type of 
faction B has no incentive to deviate if even if his type is correctly inferred. Therefore, 
the third party will correctly infer that faction B is weak if she observes any deviation to 
any  ≠ B G *
B H G ˆ . Hence, the weak type will not deviate to  ≠ B G *
B H G ˆ . But given (23) 
and the beliefs in (21), the weak type will also not deviate to  = B G *
B H G ˆ  even if he is 
mistaken for a strong type. Hence, the weak type will also not deviate. 
Now consider faction A. He will never deviate if faction B is indeed weak 
because, in this case, the third party believes that faction B is weak. So any possible 
deviation by faction A will occur if and only if faction B is strong. Then in the spirit of 
the intuitive criterion, we can support the separating equilibrium by using the following 
simple out-of-equilibrium belief: μ = 1 if  *
A L A G G ≠ . Then faction A will not deviate. 
Therefore, it trivially follows that there is a unique separating equilibrium that 
survives the Grossman-Perry refinement (stronger than the “intuitive criterion”) in which 
the strong type of faction B display some bravado but the weak type does not. Hence, the 
indirect Samaritan’s dilemma also occurs in a separating equilibrium. Note that if   29 
0 ) 1 ( M ˆ = , then in a separating equilibrium, the third party does not meddle in the conflict 
if faction B is strong. This gives 
Proposition 3 (The indirect Samaritan’s dilemma): There exists a unique separating 
equilibrium that survives the Grossman-Perry refinement in which the strong type of  
faction B pretends to be stronger than he actually is by choosing an armed investment 
higher than his full-information level of investment in order to induce the third party to 
reduce his military assistance to faction A (i.e., the third-party’s ally) or back off from 




In both the pooling and separating equilibria there is, at least, one type of faction 
B who is able to nullify faction A’s first-mover advantage by committing to an 
investment level in period 1 precisely because of the third-party’s limited information 
about faction B. Furthermore, the third party can nullify this behavior if she can choose to 
be strategically rationally ignorant of conflict in period 1. This can be summarized in the 
following proposition: 
Proposition 4: The expectation of a third-party’s assistance to an ally coupled with the 
third-party’s limited information about the strength of the enemy of her ally can be 
strategically exploited by the enemy through pronouncements that are credible. However, 
the ability of the enemy to strategically gain from his superior information no longer 
exists if the third party can strategically commit to being ignorant of the conflict or if she 
can commit to a given level of assistance based on her prior beliefs.   30 
As explained in section 1, these corollaries below follows from proposition 4: 
Corollary 1: If the equilibrium in period 1 is a pooling equilibrium, then the third party 
and her ally are strictly better off if the third party can strategically commit to being 
ignorant of the conflict in period 1 or if she can commit to a given level of assistance in 
period 2 based on her prior beliefs. 
Corollary 2: If the equilibrium in period 1 is a separating equilibrium, then the third 
party and her ally may be strictly better off if the third party can strategically commit to 
being ignorant of the conflict in period 1 or if she can commit to a given level of 
assistance in period 2 based on her prior beliefs. In this case, the third party ignores any 
improved information that she has. 
 
2.2.5 Pooling or separating equilibrium? 
   We can impose restrictions on the parameters of the model by eliminating one of 
the equilibria in propositions 2 and 3. Note that the strong type of faction B invests 
*
B H G ˆ in each of these equilibria. Also, in each of these equilibria, the respective out-of-
equilibrium beliefs in (18a) and (21) is μ(GB) = 0 for GB ∈[0, *
B H G ˆ ]. 
For all GB ∈[0, *
B H G ˆ ], the inequality in (22) and the beliefs in (21) mean that a 
necessary condition for a separating equilibrium is 
) 0 , G ( ) 1 , G ˆ ( B H
*
B H H Θ ≥ Θ                 (24) 
and 
(18a) and (19) also mean that a necessary condition for a pooling equilibrium is   31 
) 0 , G ( ) q , G ˆ ( B L
*
B H L Θ ≥ Θ                 (25) 
for all GB ∈[0, *
B H G ˆ ]. 
  Then given  ) q , G ˆ ( ) 1 , G ˆ ( *
B H H
*
B H H Θ > Θ , we can violate a necessary condition for 
the pooling equilibrium in proposition 2 and construct the separating equilibrium in 
proposition 3 such that  
) 1 , G ˆ ( ) 0 , G ( ) q , G ˆ ( *
B H H B H
*
B H H Θ ≤ Θ < Θ              (26) 
for some GB ∈[0, *
B H G ˆ ].  
  Similarly, given  ) 0 , G ˆ ( ) q , G ˆ ( *
B H L
*
B H L Θ > Θ , we can violate a necessary 
condition for the separating equilibrium in proposition 3 and construct the pooling 
equilibrium in proposition 2 such that 
) q , G ˆ ( ) 0 , G ( ) 0 , G ˆ ( *
B H L B L
*
B H L Θ ≤ Θ < Θ              (27) 
for some GB ∈[0, *
B H G ˆ ]. 
  In other words, we can find parameter values that make some of the conditions for 
constructing pooling and separating equilibria mutually exclusive which means that we 
can pick only one of the equilibria in propositions 2 and 3. 
 
3. Conclusion 
Third-party intervention in conflicts could lead to perverse outcomes (e.g., Regan, 
2002). In this paper, I found an effect dubbed the indirect Samaritan’s dilemma where a 
third-party’s intervention in a conflict does not cause her beneficiary to engage in   32 
undesirable behavior but causes those in strategic relationships with her beneficiary to 
engage in undesirable behavior. In the present model, the expectation of the third party’s 
assistance energizes the enemy of her ally in the current period and this behavior is 
purely driven by strategic considerations.  An important implication is that it may be 
strategically wrong for the third party to base her decision to intervene or withdraw from 
the conflict on how bad the current situation is. 
I did not show that the out-of-equilibrium beliefs in this paper were the only ones 
that survive the Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion or the Grossman-Perry refinement. My goal 
was not to investigate this and besides it will not add any further insight. What matters is 
to find equilibria with bravado. Any other out-of-equilibrium beliefs that support  
equilibria with bravado will only confirm the indirect Samaritan’s dilemma in this paper 
and will also confirm the result of strategic ignorance in proposition 4. 
The indirect Samaritan’s dilemma may have applications in other areas. For 
example, in Bernheim and Severinov (2003) an altruistic parent plays a signaling game 
with two children who do not strategically interact with each other. It might be interesting 
to investigate a variation of the model in Bernheim and Severinov (2003) with sibling 
rivalry (e.g., keeping up with the Joneses) and a biased parent who does not know the 
wealth of her children. The children send signals about their wealth to their parent 
through their consumption levels which are increasing in wealth and their parent’s choice 
of bequests is based on her beliefs about their wealth. 
There are several ways to extend the analysis. One extension is to consider the 
case where both factions in the conflict have an ally who is willing to offer military 
assistance. This case could be challenging and could lead to interesting strategic   33 
interactions between the third parties that are not explored in this paper especially if the 
third parties move sequentially. For example, a third-party’s assistance to her ally may 
give some information to the other third party about what the third party knows about her 
ally’s type and her inference about the type of the ally’s enemy. Another extension is to 
make the type space continuous. 
    
Appendix A 
Proof that the signaling game does not satisfy the single-crossing condition 
Consider the signaling game between the third party and faction B. To write 
faction B’s preferences defined over GB and M, one must do this conditional on what 
faction A does. Notice that GB does not enter faction B’s payoff function in period 2. 
Accordingly, conditional on faction B’s de facto first-mover role, I write his payoff 
function conditional on (a) faction A’s best response behavior for a given GB in period 1, 
and (b) the equilibrium of the game between factions A and B in period 2 for a given 
M.
24






Using (14) and (17) in the text and some arbitrary valuation, W, we can write 
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− ≡ η                   (A2) 
Then 
                                                 
24For faction A, we can his payoff function for some arbitrary investments in periods 1 and 2 by faction B 
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Suppose V ≥ W. Then (A3) implies that  0 W / < ∂ η ∂  as  0 GB →  but  0 W / > ∂ η ∂  as 
∞ → B G . Therefore, the indifference curves do not satisfy the single-crossing condition. 
 
Appendix B 
Choosing the value of λ in the out-of-equilibrium beliefs specified in (18a) 
Note that ) q , G ˆ ( ) 1 , G ˆ ( B k B k Θ > Θ . Since  1
k ˆ Π is monotonically decreasing in  
B G ˆ for  ] V , G ˆ [ G ˆ *
B H B ∈ , it follows that  ) 1 , G ˆ ( B k Θ  is monotonically decreasing in  B G ˆ for 
] V , G ˆ [ G ˆ *
B H B ∈ , k = H,L. Then there are unique values of λk which solve  
) q , G ˆ ( ) 1 , G ˆ ( B k k B k Θ = λ + Θ ,               (B1) 
k = H,L. Let the solutions be  k ˆ λ . Without loss of generality, assume that 
) q , G ˆ ( ) 1 , V ( B k k Θ ≤ Θ .
25 ] G ˆ V , 0 ( ˆ
B k − ∈ λ  Then  , k = H,L. 
  If  L H ˆ ˆ λ = λ , then we set  L H ˆ ˆ λ = λ = λ and we are done. Without loss of generality,  
suppose  L H ˆ ˆ λ > λ .
26
) ˆ G ˆ , ˆ G ˆ [ G H B L B B λ + λ + ∈
 Then the following statements hold: 
If  , then 
) q , G ˆ ( ) 1 , G ( B H B H Θ > Θ  but  ) q , G ˆ ( ) 1 , G ( B L B L Θ ≤ Θ .        (B2) 
If  ) ˆ G ˆ , G ˆ [ G L B B B λ + ∈ , then  ) q , G ˆ ( ) 1 , G ( B k B k Θ > Θ ,       (B3) 
                                                 
25 If this condition does not hold, then λ must be equal to  B G ˆ V − ≥ 0. 
26This inequality need not hold because while a given increase in investment is more costly to the weak 
type in period 1, a decrease in assistance in the form of a subsidy to faction A (as modeled here) which 
makes faction A weaker is more valuable to him (i.e., the weak type of faction B). However, my results do 
not hinge on the sign of this inequality.   35 
k = H, L. 
Given the argument in the text, the statement in (B3) implies that we must set 
L ˆ λ = λ  in (18a). Based on the intuitive criterion, the statement in (B2) implies that the 
third party must set μ = 1 for  ) ˆ G ˆ , ˆ G ˆ [ G H B L B B λ + λ + ∈ .
27 ] , ˆ G ˆ [ G H B B ∞ λ + ∈  And for  , 
no type has the incentive to deviate from the equilibrium even if the third party believes 
that he is strong, so μ = 1 is a reasonable belief. Therefore, it is reasonable for the third 
party to believe that μ = 1 for  ] , ˆ G ˆ [ G L B B ∞ λ + ∈ . All of these arguments result in the 
beliefs in (18a). 
 
Appendix C 
Alternative formulation of third party intervention 
  In the text, the third-party intervention in period 2 was modeled as a subsidy to 
faction A’s arms expenditure. Suppose instead that the third party is directly involved in 
the conflict in period 2 and so chooses her investment in arms, XC =  ) ( XC µ , where her 
belief that faction B is strong is  ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ µ . Let the cost of X units of arms be X. 
Alternatively, the formulation below need not imply that the third-party’s soldiers are 
directly involved in the conflict. It is also consistent with the interpretation that the third 
party makes transfers to faction A but the transfers are in-kind transfers in non-human 
military goods as opposed to subsidies that are conditional on faction A’s investment in 
military goods or arms. 
                                                 
27If  < λH ˆ L ˆ λ , then according to the “intuitive criterion” we should set μ = 0 over this range of investments. 
This does not change any of the results.   36 
  As before, in period 2 the third-party moves first, followed by faction A, and then 
faction B. In this period, faction B cannot signal his type since the third party moves 
before he does. 
Conditional on A k X  and  ) ( XC µ , faction B of type k chooses  B k X to maximize  
B k k
C A k B k
B k 2





= Π .            (C1) 
This gives her best-response function in period 2 as 
C A k C A k k B k X X ) X X ( W X − − + = , k = H, L.  
Conditional on  ) ( XC µ , faction A chooses  A k X to maximize  
A k
C A k B k
C A k 2






= Π .            (C2) 
It is clear from (C2) that the contributions of faction A and the third party are voluntary 
contributions to a public good. 
Putting  C A k C A k k B k X X ) X X ( W X − − + = into faction A’s payoff function 
and maximizing gives faction A’s investment in period 2 when his opponent is faction B 







X − = ,                  (C3) 
k = H, L. 
  Note from (C3) that  k
2
C A k W / V 25 . 0 X X = + . For a given Wk, the optimal 
aggregate investment in arms by the third party and faction A is unique. Given that the 
third party moves first, she will optimally choose XC = 0 knowing that faction A will   37 
choose k
2
A k W / V 25 . 0 X = . Therefore, the third party will never intervene. If S = V and 
the third party and faction A move simultaneously, then the optimal aggregate investment 
is unique but the individual investments are not.
 28
≠
 The party with the higher valuation 
contributes the entire investment in arms if V S. This result hinges on the constant 
marginal cost of arms (see Konrad, 2009). Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986) obtain a 
similar result in the general case of the voluntary contribution to public goods.  
  A model of third party intervention in which the third party never intervenes is not 
a good model. We can rectify this by allowing the third party to move after faction A has 
moved but before faction B moves. In that case, faction A will not invest in period 2 and 
will leave the entire cost of fighting faction B to the third party. This strikes me as  
unsatisfactory.  
Suppose we maintain the original timing of moves. Being allies, we would expect 
faction A and the third party to negotiate an agreement on what to do and not fully free 
ride on each other’s investment. For example, the third party, who presumably has more 
resources, might make his investment decision conditional on faction A investing some 
minimum amount  A X > 0 in arms. Alternatively, given that I have used the expressions 
“armed investment” or simply “arms” to represent a composite military good made up of 
soldiers and weapons, the third party could ask faction A to provide  A X > 0 soldiers 
while she provides the weapons for the production of the composite military good. 
Assume that faction A honors this agreement by investing in this minimum and fixed 
amount. 
                                                 
28 For increasing and strictly convex cost functions, the individual contributions will be unique (Esteban 
and Ray, 2001).   38 




µ = Π S
X X X
X X
C A B H
C A 2
C C
C A B L
C A X S
X X X
X X
) 1 ( −
+ +
+
µ − .      (C4) 




















=               (C5) 
I assume that S is sufficiently high so that  *
C X  > 0. Then given WH > WL > 0, (C5) 
implies that  0 / X*
C < µ ∂ ∂ . Then applying the envelope theorem to faction B’s payoff 
function in (C1), it follows that faction B’s equilibrium payoff in period 2 is increasing in 
μ. Hence the propositions in the text continue to hold under this alternative formulation of 
third-party intervention. 
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